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MARYLAND RuLES OF EVIDENCE
NoTEs ON THE NEW MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE
A. Codifying the Rule on Expert Testimony: Why Traditional Analysis
Should Be Generally Acceptable
Although based on the Federal Rules of Evidence, the new Mary-
land Rules in some instances differ substantively and linguistically
from their federal counterparts.' Maryland Rules 5-7022 and 5-703, s
which respectively address the admissibility of expert testimony and
the facts or data on which those experts may rely in forming their
opinions, are noteworthy in how their language both follows and dif-
fers from the corresponding federal rule. As a result, both rules will
effect a substantial evolution in the use of expert testimony in Mary-
land trial practice.
On the one hand, Maryland Rule 5-702, which mirrors the lan-
guage of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Supreme Court's re-
1. LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND RuLus oF EVIDENCE § 1.1, at 2 (1994). Opponents of codi-
fication argue that linguistic differences between the federal and Maryland rules will create
new and problematic issues of construction. Proponents, however, contend that incorpo-
rating substantive improvements into the Maryland Rules will allow for the reasoned re-
form of Maryland's evidentiary law. Id. § 1.2.
2. Maryland Rule 5-702 states:
Testimony by Experts.
Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if
the court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. In making that determination, the
court shall determine (1) whether the witness is qualified as an expert by knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the appropriateness of the ex-
pert testimony on the particular subject, and (3) whether a sufficient factual basis
exists to support the expert testimony.
MD. R. 5-702.
3. Maryland Rule 5-703 states:
Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts.
(a) In General.-The facts or data in the particular case upon which an ex-
pert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to
the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the
facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
(b) Disclosure toJury.-If determined to be trustworthy, necessary to illumi-
nate testimony, and unprivileged, facts or data reasonably relied upon by an ex-
pert pursuant to section (a) may, in the discretion of the court, be disclosed to
the jury even if those facts and data are not admissible in evidence. Upon re-
quest, the court shall instruct the jury to use those facts and data only for the
purpose of evaluating the validity and probative value of the expert's opinion or
inference.
(c) Right to Challenge Expert.-This Rule does not limit the right of an
opposing party to cross-examine an expert witness or to test the basis of the ex-




cent decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,4 should
influence Maryland courts to jettison the old Frye standard of "general
acceptance"5 for the admissibility of scientific evidence in favor of a
more self-contained, traditional relevancy analysis. On the other
hand, improvements in Maryland Rule 5-703 over the language of the
Federal Rule should prevent its operation as an automatic exception
to the hearsay rule, and thus avoid a major pitfall of Federal Rule of
Evidence 703.6
1. Summary and Comparison of the Maryland and Federal Rules.-
a. Maryland Rule 5-702.-To determine the admissibility of
expert testimony under new Maryland Rule 5-702, the court must ini-
tially make three findings: first, "the witness is qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education"; second, ex-
pert testimony is appropriate on the particular subject under consid-
eration; and third, the expert testimony is supported by a sufficient
factual basis.7 These three threshold findings enable the court to de-
termine whether the expert testimony will "assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."8 Once the
court has determined that the proffered testimony will be helpful to
the trier of fact,9 the expert may testify "in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." 10
The first prong under Maryland Rule 5-702, the requirement that
a witness be qualified as an expert "by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education," is identical to the language of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702.11 The Federal Rule, however, possesses no equivalent
4. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
5. See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
7. MD. R. 5-702.
8. Id
9. As a matter of general admissibility, the finding of helpfulness is a preliminary
question made by the court under Maryland Rule 5-104(a), which states in pertinent part:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness,
the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined
by the court .... In making its determination, the court may, in the interest of
justice, decline to require the strict application of the ruics of evidence, except
those relating to privilege and competency of witnesses.
MD. R. 5-104(a).
10. MD. R. 5-702.
11. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
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language to the second and third prongs of the Maryland Rule.1 2
Thus, Maryland Rule 5-702's three-pronged test demands a more de-
tailed preliminary inquiry than Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The
Maryland Rule and its federal counterpart also differ linguistically.13
The differences in the level of detail and language appear to have
been made purely as matters of style and clarity to provide Maryland
courts with maximum guidance on the admissibility of expert
testimony. 14
Although Maryland Rule 5-702 and Federal Rule of Evidence 702
are linguistically reconcilable, their substantive application poses
more difficult questions. Specifically, the Maryland Rule has left open
the matter of the proper standard for admitting scientific evidence.
In Frye v. United States, 5 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that novel scientific evidence "must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs."' 6 In 1978, in Reed v. State, 7 the
Maryland Court of Appeals expressly adopted the Fye standard. 8
12. 1d. Although textually silent, federal courts have long since construed and adopted
these requirements into the federal rule. See infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
13. Compare MD. R. 5-702 ("expert testimony") with FED. R. EvID. 702 ("[s]cientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge").
14. See McLain, supra note 1, § 2.702.3.
15. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (rejecting admissibility of "systolic blood pressure de-
ception test" because it had not yet gained requisite "standing and scientific recognition
among physiological and psychological authorities").
16. 1d. at 1014.
17. 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978) (holding that basis of expert's scientific opinion
must be generally accepted as reliable within expert's particular scientific field).
18. Id. at 389, 391 A.2d at 372. Since Reed, Maryland courts have consistently applied
Frye. See, e.g., Sabatier v. State Farm Mut: Auto. Ins. Co., 323 Md. 232, 249, 592 A.2d 1098,
1106 (1991) (explaining that Frye was "deliberately intended to interpose a substantial ob-
stacle to the unrestrained admission of evidence in criminal cases based upon new scien-
tific principles"); State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983) (confirming Frye-Reed
as applicable standard in Maryland); Haines v. Shanholtz, 57 Md. App. 92, 468 A.2d 1365
(applying Frye-Reed in civil case), cen. denied, 300 Md. 90, 475 A.2d 1201 (1984); Akonom v.
State, 40 Md. App. 676, 394 A.2d 1213 (1978) (ruling stipulation by parties is not basis for
admissibility where scientific evidence fails Frye-Reed test).
The Reed court, however, also recognized that some scientific tests and techniques are
so widely accepted in the scientific community that a trial court may take judicial notice of
their reliability. Reed, 283 Md. at 380, 391 A.2d at 367. Such widely accepted tests include
fingerprint identification, ballistic tests and blood tests. JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND
EvIDENCE HANDBOOK § 1406(A), at 728 (2d ed. 1993).
The legislature may also provide the appropriate standard for the admissibility of sci-
entific evidence. Id. § 1406(C); see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Ors. &JuD. PROC. § 10-915 (Supp.
1994) (DNA profile test); id. § 10-302 (breathalyzer test for intoxication); id. § 10-301
(1980) (radar test to establish speed).
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In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,19 however, the
Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded
Frye's general acceptance test for the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence.2 0 In its place, Daubert offered a flexible, non-inclusive inquiry
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 that required trial judges to con-
sider: (1) a technique's known or potential error rate; (2) whether
the theory or technique can be or has been tested; (3) whether it has
been subject to peer review and publication; and (4) its general
acceptance. 1
Only three days after Daubert was decided, the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals, nevertheless, reaffirmed the Frye-Reed test as the law
of Maryland. Given the persuasive logic of Daubert and its forceful
impact on the Federal Rules of Evidence, the future of the Fye-Reed
doctrine in light of Maryland's adoption of a code of evidence based
on the federal rules remains uncertain. 5
b. Maryland Rule 5-703.-An expert opinion may be based
on first-hand knowledge, facts related in other testimony, or hearsay
information learned before trial.24 Although the facts or data upon
which the opinion or inference is based need not be admissible in
evidence, they must be "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject."25
Facts or data "reasonably relied upon by experts" may be dis-
closed to the jury, if the court finds the facts or data trustworthy, nec-
essary to illuminate testimony, and unprivileged.26 Yet, the court also
19. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
20. Id. at 2794. Although Frye focused only on "novel" scientific techniques, the re-
quirements of Rule 702 do not apply exclusively to unconventional evidence. Id. at 2796
n.11. However, well-established propositions are less likely to be challenged than novel
ones and are more easily defended. Id.
21. Id. at 2796-97. A technique's general acceptance still has a bearing on the admissi-
bility of expert testimony, but the primary focus has shifted to the scientific validity of the
principles and methodology that underpin the expert's opinion. Id. at 2797.
22. See Keene Corp. v. Hall, 96 Md. App. 644, 626 A.2d 997, cert. granted, 332 Md. 741,
633 A.2d 102 (1993) (No. 109, Sept. term 1993, placed on inactive status Dec. 12, 1994).
Although the Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari in Keene, the Keene case is cur-
rently on inactive status pending the bankruptcy proceedings of Keene Corporation, and
will probably not be revived. Interview with Office of the Maryland Court of Appeals (Oct.
31, 1994); Interview with Joseph A. Vansant, counsel for Hall (Oct. 31, 1994).
23. See infra Part 3.
24. See MD. R. 5-703(a).
25. Id. Like the finding of helpfulness, the determination of whether an otherwise
inadmissible hearsay basis meets this test is a preliminary question under Maryland Rule 5-
104(a). See supra note 9.
26. MD. R. 5-703(b).
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retains discretion to prevent such jury disclosure.27 The court must,
upon request, instruct the jury that it may only consider those facts or
data to evaluate "the validity and probative value of the expert's opin-
ion or inference.""8 Finally, Maryland Rule 5-703 preserves the oppos-
ing party's right to cross-examine an expert or test the basis of the
expert's opinion or inference.2
Subsection (a) of Maryland Rule 5-703 is identical to Federal Rule
of Evidence 703.30 Subsections (b) and (c) of the Maryland Rule,
however, have "no parallel in the federal rule."3 1 Maryland Rule 5-703
thus possesses greater textual detail than its federal equivalent, which
not only improves Rule 5-703's style and clarity but also avoids a signif-
icant hearsay problem associated with the Federal Rule.3 2
2. Federal and State Sources of the New Rules.-
a. Rule 5-702.-The first prong of Rule 5-702, qualification
of the expert, is consistent with the wide discretion exercised by Mary-
land trial judges in qualifying experts.3 3 The second prong, appropri-
ateness of expert testimony, is also well-supported by Maryland case
law.34 In Globe Security Systems v. Sterling,35 the plaintiff sought to intro-
duce expert testimony solely related to the truthfulness of the plaintiff
in a case where plaintiffs credibility was at issue.3 6 Out of disbelief in
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. MD. K 5-703(c).
30. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 states:
Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts.
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 703.
31. See McLAIN, supra note 1, § 2.703.3.
32. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Radman v. Harold, 279 Md. 167, 367 A.2d 472 (1977) (allowing qualifica-
tion of medical expert based on her experience and knowledge of abdominal hysterecto-
mies, despite the fact that she had never performed the procedure); Consolidated
Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Ball, 263 Md. 328, 283 A.2d 154 (1971) (requiring expert
wimesses to be qualified by skill, knowledge or experience, and allowing trial judge wide
discretion in this determination).
34. See Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 612 A.2d 258 (1992) (admitting expert testimony in
area beyond juror's everyday experience based on its potential to assist jury in its decision-
making), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1312 (1993); Consolidated Mechanical Contractors, 263 Md. at
328, 283 A.2d at 154 (emphasizing that test for admissibility of expert testimony is whether
expert's opinion will aid trier of fact).
35. 79 Md. App. 303, 556 A.2d 731 (1989).
36. Id. at 306-07, 556 A.2d at 733.
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a psychologist's ability to determine whether a person's falsehood was
made with the intent to deceive, the Court of Special Appeals con-
cluded that such testimony invaded the province of the jury, whose
duty it was to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.37
The third prong of Maryland Rule 5-702, factual basis for expert
testimony, also follows Maryland case law.3 1 In Beatty v. Trailmaster
Products, Inc.,39 the plaintiff sued the designer, manufacturer, and
seller of a "lift Kit" designed to raise the suspension of a vehicle.'
Based on his background, training and experience in automobile acci-
dent reconstruction, plaintiffs expert witness stated that the Lift Kit
was foreseeably unsafe and unreasonably dangerous because it raised
a vehicle too high, "even though it was approximately 4 inches below
the statutory maximum set by the legislature."
41
Plaintiff's expert offered no additional scientific or other eviden-
tiary support for his opinion and during a deposition stated that the
statutory standard was simply too high.4 2 The Court of Appeals held
that the expert's opinion was insufficient evidence to survive summary
judgment, particularly as the expert had cited "neither developing
consensus nor sound data to buttress his opinion."43 The court de-
clared that an "'expert's judgment has no probative force unless there
is a sufficient basis upon which to support his conclusions.'"'
The second and third prongs of new Maryland Rule 5-702 also
find support in federal case law. In Persinger v. Norfolk & Western Rail-
way Co.,45 the plaintiff sued his former employer for injuries sustained
while lifting a 75-pound motor during the course of his employment.
The trial court allowed plaintiff's expert to testify that the weight
plaintiff had to lift to perform his job was unreasonable. 4 The Fourth
Circuit held that the expert testimony should have been excluded,
37. Id. at 308-09, 556 A.2d at 734.
38. See, e.g., Evans v. State, 322 Md. 24, 585 A.2d 204 (1991) (concluding expert's opin-
ion that defendant suffered from mental disorder was not sufficiently supported by founda-
tion facts and reasons); Globe Security Sys., 79 Md. App. at 307, 556 A.2d at 733 (an "expert's
opinion. . . is admissible only if it is based upon a legally sufficient factual foundation").
39. 330 Md. 726, 625 A.2d 1005 (1993).
40. Id. at 730, 625 A.2d at 1007.
41. Id. at 739-40, 625 A.2d at 1012.
42. Id. at 740, 625 A.2d at 1012.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 741, 625 A.2d at 1012 (quoting Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 275, 539 A.2d
657, 661 (1988)).
45. 920 F.2d 1185 (4th Cir. 1990).
46. See id& at 1188.
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because the subject in question, the amount of weight that it is safe to
lift, was within the common knowledge of jurors.47
In Sparks v. Gilley Trucking Co.,' the plaintiff brought a negli-
gence action for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The
trial court admitted the testimony of the defendant's expert, a police-
man experienced in accident investigation and reconstruction, who
opined that the plaintiff had been speeding based upon the length
and direction of the skid marks, the highway surface, the condition of
the car, and the tree that was hit.49 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged
that expert testimony not supported by a sufficient factual basis may
be excluded but held that the policeman's factual assumptions were
supported by the evidence.5" Thus, although Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702 does not contain the explicit language of Maryland Rule 5-
702, federal courts have construed both "appropriateness""t and "suf-
ficient factual basis"12 requirements into the federal rule as essential
to its operation as a gatekeeper to admit only helpful expert
testimony.
5 3
b. Rule 5-703.-The notion that expert opinions may be
based on first-hand knowledge, facts related in other testimony, or
hearsay information, as long as experts in the particular field reason-
ably rely on such facts or data in forming their opinions, is not foreign
to Maryland case law.54 As the Committee Note to Maryland Rule 5-
703 indicates, subsections (b) and (c) are derived from Kentucky Rule
of Evidence 703,"5 which is derived from an ABA committee proposal
47. Id.
48. 992 F.2d 50 (4th Cir. 1993).
49. Id. at 53-54.
50. Id. at 54.
51. See also United States v. Fowler, 932 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding expert testi-
mony about defendant's confused state of mind inadmissible because juries regularly de-
cide such factual inquiries); United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431 (4th Cir.) (finding expert
testimony about co-conspirator's ability to tell truth inadmissible because issue of credibil-
ity is strictly for jury), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988).
52. See Fowler, 932 F.2d at 312 (acknowledging that expert testimony must be supported
by adequate foundation).
53. Id. at 315.
54. See, e.g., Consolidated Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Ball, 263 Md. 328, 335-36,
283 A.2d 154, 158 (1971) (supporting admissibility of expert testimony based on hearsay
where such reports are relied on by expert in practice of her profession); cf. Hartless v.
State, 327 Md. 558, 611 A.2d 581 (1992) (explaining if expert opinion is entirely unsup-
ported by substantive evidence, then the opinion is inadmissible).
55. Sections (b) and (c) of Kentucky Rule 703 state:
(b) If determined to be trustworthy, necessary to illuminate testimony, and
unprivileged, facts or data relied upon by an expert pursuant to subdivision (a)
may at the discretion of the court be disclosed to the jury even though such facts
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to amend the federal rule.56 In large part, the ABA's proposed
amendments 7 were designed to "settle the question of whether Rule
703 creates a giant automatic exception to the hearsay rule for other-
wise inadmissible hearsay reports and opinions.""8 Essentially, the
ABA's goal was to prohibit the potential abuse of the Rule by practi-
tioners who used it to present evidence otherwise inadmissible. 9 To
allow experts to go beyond the simple identification of the source of
their conclusions to an extensive recitation from another's report re-
or data are not admissible in evidence. Upon request the court shall admonish
the jury to use such facts or data only for the purpose of evaluating the validity
and probative value of the expert's opinion or inference.
(c) Nothing in this rule is intended to limit the right of an opposing party to
cross-examine an expert witness or to test the basis of an expert's opinion or
inference.
Ky. R. EVID. 703.
56. See MCLAN, supra note 1, § 2.703.3. Professor McLain characterizes the Kentucky
Rule as "an abbreviated version of an ABA Committee's proposal.., to amend the federal
rule." Id.
57. 'The pertinent proposed amendment to Federal Rule 703 is section (b):
(b) Admissibility of Underlying Facts and Data.
Except as provided hereinafter in this rule, the facts and data underlying an
expert's opinion or inference must be independently admissible in order to be
received in evidence on behalf of the party offering the expert, and the expert's
reliance on facts or data that are not independently admissible does not render
those facts or data admissible in that party's behalf.
(1) Exception.
Facts or data underlying an expert's opinion or inference that are not inde-
pendently admissible may be admitted in the discretion of the court on behalf of
the party offering the expert, if they are trustworthy, necessary to illuminate the
testimony, and not privileged. In such instances, upon request, their use ordina-
rily shall be confined to showing the expert's basis.
(2) Discretion Whether or Not Independently Admissible.
Whether underlying facts and data are independently admissible or not, the
mere fact that the expert witness has relied upon them does not alone require the
court to receive them in evidence on request of the party offering the expert.
(3) Opposing Party Unrestricted.
Nothing in this rule restricts admissibility of an expert's basis when offered
by a party opposing the expert.
ABA Comm. on Rules of Crim. Pro. and Evid., Crim. Just. Sec., Federal Rules of Evidence: A
Fresh Review and Evaluation, 120 F.R.D. 299, 369-70 (1987) [hereinafter Fresh Review].
58. Id. at 371.
59. PeterJ. Rescorl, Comment, Fed. R Evid. 703: A Back Door Entrance for Hearsay and
Other Inadmissible Evidence: A Time for Change, 63 TEMP. L. Rav. 543, 556 (1990); see also
Edward B. Arnolds, Federal Rule of Evidence 703: The Back Door is Wide Open, 20 FORUM 1, 18
(1984) (explaining that such abuse of the Federal Rule is an increasingly common trial
tactic).
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suits in the "back door" introduction of a nontestifying expert's report
which may impinge on the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.6"
The ABA Committee's Comment to Proposed Rule 703 also
makes clear that the court's discretion to admit the independently
inadmissible basis of an expert's opinion is subject to Rule 403.61 Not
surprisingly the Committee Note to Maryland Rule 5-703 also recog-
nizes the Confrontation Clause and Maryland Rule 5-403 as limita-
tions to the court's discretion to disclose the basis of an expert's
opinion to the jury.62
To the extent that substantively inadmissible hearsay may be ad-
mitted for the sole purpose of explaining the factual basis of an ex-
pert's opinion, Maryland Rule 5-703(b) codifies Maryland case law. In
Maryland Department of Human Resources v. Bo Peep Day Nursery,63 the
Department revoked the defendant's license based on findings that
several preschool age children had been subject to physical and sexual
abuse at defendant's child care center.64 The Department's expert, a
clinical psychologist, opined that two of the children she treated had
been sexually abused at Bo Peep, based in part on parental statements
and statements made by the children in therapy sessions.65 The Court
of Appeals held that statements of history related by the patient to a
nontreating medical practitioner, who was engaged only to render an
expert opinion, were admissible for the limited purpose of explaining
the basis of the expert's opinion.66
60. Fresh Review, supra note 57, at 371. The Sixth Amendment states in pertinent part,
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
61. Fresh Review, supra note 57, at 372. Rule 403 requires the court to determine if the
probative value of the proffered evidence is "substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R.
EVID. 403.
62. The text of the Committee Note to Maryland Rule 5-703 states:
Subject to Rule 5-403, and in criminal cases the confrontation clause, experts who
rely on information from others may relate that information in their testimony if
it is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. If it is inadmissible as
substantive proof, it comes in merely to explain the factual basis for the expert
opinion. The opposing party then is entitled to an instruction to the jury that it
may consider the evidence only for that limited purpose.
MD. R. 5-703, committee note.
63. 317 Md. 573, 565 A.2d 1015 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1067 (1990).
64. Id. at 577, 565 A.2d at 1017.
65. Id. at 588, 565 A.2d at 1022-23.
66. Id. at 589, 565 A.2d at 1023; see aiso Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Nothstein, 300
Md. 667, 679, 480 A.2d 807, 813 (1984) (recognizing that substantively inadmissible hear-
say is only admissible to explain the basis of the expert's opinion).
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Maryland Rule 5-703 is in harmony with Maryland case law which
also provides for an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury.67
Under Maryland Rule 5-703, however, the admission of hearsay to ex-
plain the basis of the opinion hinges on whether the underlying facts
are "trustworthy, necessary to illuminate testimony, and un-
privileged."6" Given these three qualifications, derived from the Ken-
tucky Rule and the ABA's proposed amendment, Maryland Rule 5-
703(b) should operate to prevent the type of abuses that have plagued
the Federal Rule. In this respect, the textual differences between the
Maryland and federal rules cannot simply be explained away by con-
siderations of style and clarity, but reflect a carefully reasoned strategy
to ensure the proper substantive application of the Maryland Rule, in
light of identifiable problems experienced under the Federal Rule.
3. Reconciling Maryland Rule 5-702 with the Frye-Reed Doctrine.-
The question remains whether, under the new code of evidence,
Maryland courts will continue to require that the proponent of scien-
tific tests or findings show general acceptance of the underlying prin-
ciples or techniques under the Frye-Reed standard in lieu of the
traditional requirements of relevancy and helpfulness to the trier of
fact.69 The silence of the Rule on the appropriate standard7" for ad-
mitting scientific evidence conjures the same interpretive differences
that afflicted Federal Rule 702 prior to the Daubert decision in 1993.71
In view of this history, Maryland's codification of its rules of evidence
counsels in favor of the re-examination of the general acceptance
standard.
a. The Benefits of Frye-Reed.-Proponents of the Frye-Reed
general acceptance standard argue that: (1) it provides a "method by
67. See, e.g., Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 368 A.2d 1005 (1977) (requiring that jury
be instructed to evaluate inadmissible hearsay statement only to explain the basis of ex-
pert's conclusions and not as proof of the truth of statement).
68. MD. R. 5-703(b).
69. See 1 KENNETH S. BROUN Er AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 873-74 (John W.
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
70. As an historical parallel, Frye was also the dominant standard for admissibility in the
federal courts when the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted. United States v. Down-
ing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1234 (3d Cir. 1985). As with Maryland Rule 5-702, neither the text of
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, nor the accompanying notes of the Advisory Committee,
indicated the proper admissibility standard for novel scientific evidence. I.
71. Proponents of the "general acceptance standard" argued that Fye was a judicial
creation, and that nothing in the language of the rules suggested a disapproval of such
interstitial judicial rule-making. Id at 1235. Opponents contended that the Rule's silence
should be regarded as tantamount to abandonment of the general acceptance standard.
Id. at 1234.
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which courts can assess the reliability of novel scientific expert testi-
mony" by permitting experts who know the most about a procedure to
assess its status;7" (2) it promotes uniformity of decisions by guarantee-
ing the existence of a coterie of experts qualified to testify about the
status of a particular procedure;73 (3) it avoids "complex, expensive,
and time-consuming courtroom dramas";74 and (4) it safeguards
against the possible prejudicial effects of testimony based upon an un-
proven hypothesis in an isolated experiment and shields juries from
any tendency to treat scientific evidence as infallible.75
In Reed v. State76 the Court of Appeals invoked each of these argu-
ments to justify its adoption of the Frye standard in Maryland.7 7 The
court stated that fairness to the litigant required that a scientific judg-
ment be rendered on the reliability of a particular scientific process,
before the result of that process could be used against her.7 8 The
court expressed concern that to allow scientific techniques not gener-
ally accepted into evidence would cause the proceedings to "degener-
ate into trials of the technique itself" and distract the fact finder from
rendering judgment on the merits of the case.79 The court's most
"compelling reasons" to adopt Frye were a belief that juries are incom-
petent to evaluate expert testimony and the perception that only the
Frye test would ensure the availability of a minimum reserve of experts
to examine a particular scientific technique in a given case.8 °
b. The Disadvantages of Frye-Reed.-Opponents of Frye-Reed
argue that: (1) its vague terms allow courts "to manipulate the param-
eters of the relevant 'scientific community' and the level of agreement
needed for 'general acceptance"';"' (2) it may require courts "to ex-
clude much probative and reliable information from the jury's consid-
eration," 2 and, conversely, it may "admit into evidence expert
testimony that derives from inaccurate or unreliable principles or
72. Id. at 1235.
73. Id.; see also BROUN Er AL., supra note 69, § 203, at 873.
74. BROUN ET AL.., supra note 69, § 203, at 873.
75. See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1235-36; BROUN ET AL., supra note 69, § 203, at 873.
76. 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978).
77. See id. at 381-89, 391 A.2d at 368-72.
78. Id. at 385, 391 A.2d at 369-70.
79. Id. at 388, 391 A.2d at 371-72.
80. Id. at 496, 391 A.2d at 424 (Smith, J., dissenting).




techniques";"3 and (3) it has historically proven to be "too malleable
to provide the method for orderly and uniform decision-making."84
Judge Smith's dissent in Reed relied primarily on Frye's lack of de-
finitive criteria to determine "'who and how large the pertinent scien-
tific community must be.'""5 The existence of "'I[a]bsolute certainty
of result or unanimity of scientific opinion is not required for admissi-
bility because every useful new development must have its first day in
court.'- 8 6 Judge Smith's dissent also remarked on the fundamental
inconsistency between the Federal Rules of Evidence, or a state evi-
dence code patterned after the federal rules, which favors the admissi-
bility of expert testimony whenever it is relevant and assists the trier of
fact, and the Frye rule, which imposes "'an additional, independently
controlling standard.' "87
c. Proposed Solution.--Convinced that Frye's objectives can be
met with less drastic constraints on the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence, a substantial consensus of both courts and commentators88 op-
posed to Frye has offered numerous alternatives including: a
substantial acceptance test;89 an evaluation of reliability or validity,
rather than the extent of acceptance;90 use of a panel of experts,
rather than the courts, to screen new developments for acceptance;9 1
and the observance of traditional standards of relevancy.
92
83. Id. at 1236 n.14.
84. Id. at 1237.
85. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 406, 391 A.2d 364, 380 (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting
John F. Decker & Joel Handler, Voiceprint Identification Evidence-Out of the Frye Pan and
Into Admissibility, 26 Am. U. L. REV. 314, 361-62 (1977)).
86. Reed, 283 Md. at 462, 391 A.2d at 408 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975)).
87. Id. at 467, 391 A.2d at 411 (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 491 (2d ed.
1972)).
88. See, e.g., BROUN ET AL., supra note 69, § 203, at 873.
89. See Baler, 519 F.2d at 463 (applying more relaxed standard than Frye requiring only
that theory be sufficiently proven to allow jury to give evidence whatever weight it sees fit).
90. See Fredric I. Lederer, Resolving the Frye Dilemma--A Reliability Approach, 115 F.R.D.
84, 85 (1987) (suggesting that proffered evidence merely satisfy relevance requirements of
Federal Rule of Evidence 401, which demands evaluation of evidence's probative worth,
and the helpfulness requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 702).
91. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1231 (1980) (discussing approach that
requires independent body of experts to review novel scientific techniques before they
could be used in court).
92. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993)
(explaining that Federal Rule of Evidence 702's requirement that expert testimony "assist
the trier of fact" goes primarily to relevance); Margaret A. Berger, A Relevancy Approach to
Novel Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 89, 89-91 (1987) (explaining that courts should balance
probative value against countervailing considerations to admissibility specified in Federal
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As a threshold matter, the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. acknowledged that Fiye's rigid and exclusive
general acceptance test was at odds with the liberal thrust of the fed-
eral rules and their general approach that relaxes traditional barriers
to opinion testimony.9" An exclusive Frye standard is also inherently
inconsistent with a state code of evidence patterned after the federal
rules.94 Given this logic and Maryland's recent adoption of a code of
evidence based on the federal model, Frye-Reed simply should not en-
dure as an independent and exclusive admissibility test for novel sci-
entific evidence in Maryland.
To resolve the dilemma of Frye-Reed and new Rule 5-702, Mary-
land courts should exercise and apply Rule 5-702 consistent with its
foundational sources in order to reconcile conflicts with the common
law. Traditional relevancy analysis under the new Maryland Rules,
tempered by application of the rules governing expert testimony, is
clearly the most appealing resolution to the Frye dilemma.
Maryland Rule 5-401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence hav-
ing any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."95 Maryland Rule 5-
402 states, moreover, that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by constitu-
tions, statutes, or these rules, or by decisional law not inconsistent with
these rules,[96] all relevant evidence is admissible."97 The mere rele-
vance of scientific evidence does not hinge on general acceptance of a
theory.
Rule of Evidence 403 to decide whether expert may testify about novel scientific theory);
Giannelli, supra note 91, at 1235 (oudining three-step process under the rules to require
that a court: determine probative value of evidence; identify dangers such as potential for
misleading jury; and balance probative value against identified dangers); Mark McCor-
mick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOwA L. REv. 879, 911-12
(1982) (proposing new model of traditional analysis and foreshadowing several factors rec-
ommended by Court in Daubert to determine admissibility of scientific evidence).
93. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794. The Court stated that Fye's "austere standard, absent
from and incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in fed-
eral trials." Id.
94. Cf State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978) (holding that Frye was inconsistent
with and not incorporated into Maine rules of evidence, which were patterned after federal
rules). Judge Smith's dissent in Reed drew upon the reasoning of Wi//iams to attack the
requirement of "general acceptance" as an unnecessarily stringent condition for establish-
ing relevancy. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 500, 391 A.2d 364, 426 (1978) (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
95. MD. R. 5-401.
96. This provision could form the basis to overrule the Frye-Reed doctrine as inconsis-
tent with the Maryland rules. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
97. MD. R. 5-402.
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However, Maryland Rule 5-402 is limited by Maryland Rule 5-702.
The crux of Maryland Rule 5-702, like its federal equivalent, is
whether expert testimony will be helpful to the trier of fact. In order
to characterize this helpfulness requirement as a counterweight to a
simple relevance analysis, the Third Circuit in United States v. Down-
in 9 surmised:
Although... "helpfulness" necessarily implies a quantum of
reliability beyond that required to meet a standard of bare
logical relevance.... it also seems clear... that some scien-
tific evidence can assist the trier of fact in reaching an accu-
rate determination of facts in issue even though the
principles underlying the evidence have not become "gener-
ally accepted" in the field to which they belong.99
While general acceptance should have a bearing on the inquiry, it is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for admissibility.100 In
fact, many factors may bear on the inquiry.' l Maryland's underlying
goals of codification militate in favor of adopting an analysis that
tracks Daubert.
Professor McLain identifies, among several others, the following
goals of codification: (1) to facilitate analysis of federal case law con-
struing analogous federal rules; (2) to expand the role that Maryland
decisions play in the national discourse and facilitate the Maryland
courts' influence of federal jurisprudence; (3) to promote in national
scholarly works the inclusion of the Maryland Code and case law that
construes it, perhaps informing other jurisdictions' construction of
their own evidence rules.1°2 Maryland's ability to accomplish each of
these goals is diminished by its observance of the increasingly minority
position of Frye-Reed. The utility of federal case law to Maryland case
law, and vice versa, increases as a function of the analytical uniformity
between the two.10 3
98. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
99. Id. at 1235.
100. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993);
Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237. Notably, the Supreme Court in Daubert relied heavily upon, and
closely tracked the reasoning of Downing in developing its opinion.
101. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796; Downing, 753 F.2d at 1239.
102. MCI.N, supra note 1, § 1.2, at 3.
103. Id. § 1.2, at 2-3. The Kentucky Evidence Rules Study Committee also strived for
uniformity between the Kentucky Rules and the Federal Rules and reasoned that uniform-
ity "would minimize the possibility of forum shopping and promote judicial efficiency."
John M. Dosker, The Kentucky Rules of Evidence: Trojan Horse or Improvement Over Common
Law?, 20 N. Ky. L. REv. 701, 702 (1993).
In her review of the goals of codifying the Federal Rules of Evidence, Professor Berger
characterized the rules on expert testimony as an area in which the flexible, case-by-case
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If Maryland were to adopt the Daubert analysis, Rule 5-702 would
continue to ensure that "any and all scientific testimony or evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."104 Under a Daubert analy-
sis, "Rule 702 governs all aspects of the general explanatory theory
while [Rule] 703 controls the manner in which the specific facts of the
pending case are factored into the expert's reasoning."105 In effect,
the Daubert decision has solved two problems at once: It rejects the
Frye standard and it resolves the confusion over which rule properly
validates the standard for the admissibility of expert testimony in favor
of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.106 The validation analysis under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 702, together with a narrow interpretation of
Federal Rule of Evidence 703, will ensure coherent interaction among
the rules as a whole, while it guarantees that "expert testimony law
rests on sound evidentiary policy.""0 7 Interestingly, by framing the is-
sue of the proper standard for the admissibility of expert testimony in
the Committee Note to Maryland Rule 5-702,18 Maryland's drafters
may be preparing to recognize Dauberfs persuasive reasoning, with re-
spect to both the proper admissibility standard and the rule under
which it should be applied.
4. Conclusion.-Maryland Rule 5-702 enjoys stylistic and clarify-
ing improvements over its federal counterpart, but is otherwise textu-
ally reconcilable. Maryland Rule 5-703 also improves on its federal
equivalent through language designed to prevent the use of the rule
as a "back door" exception to the hearsay rule. With respect to the
admissibility of scientific evidence, Maryland Rule 5-702's substantive
approach mandated by the federal rules was working well, and "where rigid rules excluding
entire categories of evidence[, like the Frye rule,] should not be allowed to develop." Mar-
garet A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals of Codification, 12
HorS'rRA L. REv. 255, 271 (1984).
104. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
105. EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of "Facts or Data" in Federal Rule of Evidence 703:
The Significance of the Supreme Court's Decision to Rely on Federal Rule 702 in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 54 MD. L. Rv. 352, 368 (1995).
106. See Michael C. McCarthy, Note, "Helpful" or "Reasonably Reliable"? Analyzing the Ex-
pert Witness's Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, 77 CORNELL L. Rrv. 350,
387 (1992) (highlighting need for clear exposition of Rules 702 and 703 in light of confu-
sion among courts and commentators concerning proper application of these rules).
107. Imwinkelried, supra note 105, at 375.
108. The Committee Note to Maryland Rule 5-702 reads:
This Rule is not intended to overrule Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978) and other
cases adopting the principles enunciated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923). The required scientific foundation for the admission of novel scien-
tific techniques or principles is left to development through case law. Compare
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
MD. R. 5-702, committee note.
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language conflicts with Maryland's judicially created Frye-Reed stan-
dard. Nevertheless, proper application of Maryland's new rules of evi-
dence, consideration of the underlying goals of codification, and
judicial deference to the sources of the Maryland rules, dictate that
this conflict should be resolved by resort to the traditional relevancy
analysis contained within the rules themselves.
KEVIN M. CARROLL
B. Residual Hearsay Exceptions: A New Opening?
In a significant change from Maryland's common law, the newly
adopted Maryland Rules of Evidence1 provide for the admission of
hearsay evidence that does not fall within one of the commonly recog-
nized exceptions to the hearsay rule.' These exceptions are known as
the residual hearsay exceptions. Maryland Rule 5-803(b) (24)
provides:
Under exceptional circumstances, the following are not ex-
cluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness: A statement not specifically covered by
any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court deter-
mines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of
justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. A statement may not be admitted under this ex-
ception unless the proponent of it makes known to the ad-
verse party, sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare
to meet it, the intention to offer the statement and the par-
ticulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant.'
1. 21 Md. Reg. 1 (Jan. 7, 1994).
2. Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted." MD. R. 5-801(c). Maryland Rule 5-803 lists 22 exceptions to the hearsay rule that
are applicable even though the hearsay declarant is available to testify. MD. R. 5-803(b).
3. MD. R. 5-803(b)(24).
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